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3As the Internet continues to become further integrated into all aspects of 
the global culture and economy, society has an increasing stake in pursu-
ing socially beneficial and collective goals. Most people would agree, for 
instance, that society has a definite interest in preventing the dissemination 
of illicit child pornography or in mitigating the effects of widespread com-
puter virus outbreaks. Some type of governance is vitally necessary to serve 
the interests of the public community, and indeed, such governance of the 
Internet has already emerged—although how these systems have emerged 
remains something of a puzzle. How have government institutions, private 
commercial firms, and the scientific academic community been able to create 
and implement rules and procedures for both the functional operation of the 
Internet and the behavior that takes place on it? To what extent and in what 
ways have these governance policies and arrangements emerged as a result of 
institutional decision-making and public policy processes at the federal level 
in the United States? 
This book’s main objectives will be, first, to develop a new model that 
deconstructs the Internet into four conceptual layers with the aim of helping 
scholars and policymakers better understand various Internet policy issues, 
and, second, to use this model in formulating a new political architecture 
that accurately maps out and depicts authority on the Internet by identifying 
who has decision-making authority and, therefore, a clear ability to shape 
behavior. We will then assess this four-layer model and its resulting map of 
political architecture by performing a detailed case study of U.S. national 
cybersecurity policy, post-9/11. 
This study will examine the Internet from a public policy perspective, with 
a particular focus on policymaking processes and institutional arrangements. 
Specific institutions of various types have played a crucial historical role in 
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4 Chapter 1
shaping the direction of both how the Internet has evolved technologically as 
well as in setting the rules for how people use it. The Internet did not emerge 
spontaneously, nor did its present incarnation develop by accident. Rather, 
the Internet and all of its characteristics were consciously shaped as a direct 
result of explicit policy decisions.
The central question, then, is who governs the Internet? Which institutions, 
individuals, or other actors are shaping both the substance and direction of 
Internet governance policies? As the Internet continues to become more cul-
turally and economically significant, it is important to investigate what type 
of governance is emerging and why it is emerging in that way. 
WHAT do We MeAn by “GovernAnCe”?
Let’s begin by dispelling a common myth. If you ask a random person off 
the street today, “Who governs the Internet?,” the reply is typically, “Nobody 
does.” Such is the prevailing wisdom—originating out of early Internet folk-
lore that mistakenly equated decentralization with ungovernability. However, 
to the individual replying that nobody governs the Internet, a follow-up ques-
tion along the lines of, “So can you do anything you want on the Internet 
without fear of consequence?,” the reply is also just as frequently, “Of course 
not.” And there’s the disconnect. Many people still stubbornly hold onto the 
notion that the Internet cannot be governed, and yet nearly all of those same 
people freely admit that others have authority over their actions.
My contentions are that the Internet is, in fact, being governed; that it is 
being governed by specific and identifiable networks of policy actors; and 
that an argument can be made as to how it is being governed.
For one undeniable example that the Internet is being governed, take the 
existence of its DNS, or domain name system. The reason why when a user 
types the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) “www.google.com” into their 
web browser they can reliably expect to reach the website of the Google 
Search engine is that a public-private hybrid institution named ICANN (the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) has been developed 
over time to create a system for administering Internet domain names, ensur-
ing their uniqueness, linking them to IP addresses, creating requirements 
for registration, and implementing formal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
ICANN is a nonprofit institution that was originally created by private-sector 
actors in response to a mandate issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
under the Clinton administration, which sought to cede control over the man-
agement of the Internet’s system of centrally coordinated identifiers, for rea-
sons which will be explored in Chapter 2. ICANN manages the DNS system, 
maintaining the Internet’s operational functionality, using a multi-stakeholder 
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model that incorporates businesses, governments, civil society organizations, 
and academic and scientific organizations, and is international in scope.1 It 
is responsible for overseeing the Internet’s core root name servers and all of 
its 639 generic top-level domains (gTLDs), including the core six—.com, 
.org, .net, .edu, .gov, and .mil,—and 248 country code top-level domains 
(ccTLDs),2 as well as for making decisions over the adoption of future 
TLDs, which have sometimes proven to be controversial.3 The very fact 
that the DNS exists and keeps the Internet operational is direct evidence 
of governance policy, and certainly refutes notions of the Internet being 
“ungovernable.” 
So what do we mean, then, in asking, “Who governs”? In academia, the 
phrase “Internet Governance” is fairly well established. Milton Mueller, a 
scholar of political economy, was an early researcher in the field and adopted 
a narrow definition, referring to the phrase only in terms of the Internet’s 
functional operation with research focusing on the ICANN and DNS sys-
tems.4 To this day, the phrase “Internet Governance” largely is used only in 
reference to the administration of the DNS system. Subsequent scholars like 
Laura DeNardis have similarly adopted this narrow definition in examin-
ing the adoption of the Internet’s technical protocols like IPv6 and the roles 
played by a small handful of semipublic international consortium groups like 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in standards-setting processes.5
But why should use of the phrase “Internet Governance” be so limited? 
I argue that a far broader, more comprehensive definition is called for. 
It ought to include the study not only of who makes decisions over the 
Internet’s technical functionality, but also of who holds authority over much 
of the activity that takes place on it. In other words, we also want to be able 
to study the follow-up question of, “Can you do anything you want on the 
Internet without fear of consequence?” and “Why or why not?”
So, when asking, “who governs,” the definition which will be used here 
adopts a broad policymaking approach and views governance as having three 
criteria: (1) the ability to constrain behavior; (2) the ability to enable behav-
ior; and (3) the ability to produce intentional effects. Actors are said to govern 
when they have clear decision-making authority to create and implement 
policies with intentional effects that meet all three of these criteria.
To be clear, the issue here is one of governance, not government.6 From 
Robert Dahl to C. Wright Mills, scholars have long sought to determine who 
has power, why they have it, and how they use it. In pluralist theory, power 
has many dimensions and is held in varying degrees by numerous actors—
from individual people to large corporations to formal governmental institu-
tions. Indeed, Dahl’s approach in famously asking “Who Governs?” was to 
question how various interest groups compete in the political sphere, and that 
governance is ultimately determined by the relative capacities of different 
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actors to influence governmental decision-making.7 The questions at hand, in 
the context of the Internet, remain how all of those different actors are orga-
nized in creating and exercising their relative levels of authority. However, 
what sets the Internet apart from Dahl’s analysis, as will be demonstrated 
time and again, is that on the Internet, it is not merely a matter of govern-
ment having final decision-making authority, but also, to a considerable 
degree, numerous private actors as well. The Internet governance dynamic is 
characterized by various competing interest groups not only trying to influ-
ence government, but also competing to influence each other, and sometimes 
government trying to influence them. Identifying who holds authority versus 
who is trying to wield influence, perhaps more clear in Dahl’s day, is an 
increasingly difficult task. Thus, not only do we need to ask who has power, 
but also who has more power than whom?
Understanding who has the power to govern is a political question. Gov-
ernance is inextricably linked with concepts of power, and in that context, 
both must be defined for the purpose of this project. This is not to say that 
we plan on comprehensively defining these two ideas at the heart of Political 
Science—governance and power—once-and-for-all. Rather, it is necessary to 
clearly state which definitions will be used to carry out our specific research.
The literature on governance has markedly shifted in recent years from 
focusing on hierarchical governmental structures toward greater reliance on 
horizontal, hybridized, and associational forms of governance.8
 In the field of 
public administration, for instance, scholars such as Frederickson and Smith 
have observed this re-focus from the bureaucratic state and direct government 
to the “hollow state” and “third-party government.”9 Governance theories that 
incorporate ideas about the role of “conjunctions” or “associations” among 
organizational entities have become increasingly widespread.10
This “governance fever”11 focusing on horizontal relationships between 
public- and private-sector actors has seen a deconstruction of the governance 
concept into several categorical types. Network governance, most frequently 
used for characterizing the Internet, is commonly associated with ideas of 
“self-governance” or “self-regulation.” It refers to loosely structured coor-
dination among numerous actors that function like an “organic or informal 
social system.”12 Network governance, as Taylor has argued, arises because 
of modern societies’ complexities and their consequent requirement for dis-
tributed knowledge acquisition and decentralized problem-solving.13 In con-
trast, hierarchical governance embraces the activities of government, law, 
and statutory regulation.14 It describes processes that are characterized by 
vertical integration and managerial control within a set of lead institutions, 
and is the traditional method of analysis for studying top-down bureaucratic 
organizations. Meanwhile, market governance is equated with the forces 
of effective free-market competition with the invisible hand governing 
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behavior.15 There have also recently been new additional theories developed 
as scholars have sought to meaningfully depict what’s occurring on the Inter-
net specifically. Adhocratic governance, for example, is based on the idea of 
policy being made “ad-hoc,” meaning in an improvised, on-the-fly type of 
manner, and that decision-making is guided by simply dealing with problems 
as they arise.16 According to scholars like Mintzberg, “adhocracy” is a system 
superior to bureaucracy and one that will even eventually replace it. It is “any 
form of organization that cuts across normal bureaucratic lines to capture 
opportunities, solve problems, and get results.”17
These are some of the theories about governance, but when it comes to 
actually defining the broader concept of the term, specifically from a policy-
making perspective, the approach undertaken by Lawrence Lessig and others 
is most helpful.18 This is the Foucauldian conception of power that involves 
both constraint and enablement.19 Actors are said to hold power if they have 
demonstrated the ability to (1) constrain certain forms of behavior as well as 
to (2) enable other forms of behavior. This is echoed by Mills who defined 
the power elite as being “in positions to make decisions having major con-
sequences” and that “whether they do or do not make such decisions is less 
important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions.”20 It must 
be stated, however, that also central to our understanding of governance is 
the importance of intentionality. Bertrand Russell is famous for arguing that 
power is “the production of intended effects,”21 and considering the level of 
intentionality of potential governing actors is extremely important for our 
discussion insofar as intentionality signals causality. We want to be able to 
distinguish between those actors who are structurally positioned to make 
decisions and create policies with intentional effects versus those who can be 
weeded out from the governance discussion because their role in causality is 
hazy, at best.
If such a definition for power is utilized then identifying who holds power 
on the Internet can be answered more scientifically. The goal of this research 
is to identify those actors who simply have influence in the policy process 
versus those who have repeatedly provided evidence of their decision-making 
authority through policymaking. Who has influence versus who has authority 
is a critical distinction.
With regard to the Internet, it follows that governance can be defined as 
the practical exercise of decision-making authority through a demonstrated 
ability to create policies that constrain or enable behavior with intentional 
effects. Recurring throughout the existing Internet governance literature is 
the idea that governance is the persistent shaping of the environment through 
explicit decision-making.22 We will build on this notion to show that the 
Internet’s policies—inclusive of policies not only made by governments, but 
by various private actors as well—are authoritative insofar as they meet the 
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criteria of our definition above, and that empirical evidence comes in the form 
of existing statements of policy intent that correlate with evidence of policy 
actions. Actors who have the decision-making authority to create policies 
that effectively constrain or enable Internet behavior can reasonably be said 
to govern.
Determining who has this ability to govern through policymaking can 
further be analyzed by examining what Marcus Franda has called “single con-
trolling points.”23 We will examine the numerous “single controlling points” 
on the Internet where behavior is constrained or enabled—examples include 
the Web hosts that operate servers, the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who 
deliver Internet access, the websites that control user accounts through Terms 
of Service (TOS) agreements, and the local and national governments who 
can still assert their territorial jurisdiction. By analyzing exactly where Inter-
net policies are being created that intentionally constrain or enable behavior, 
it is here where our inquiries for determining governance will focus.
This interpretation of governance, then, refers to coordinated efforts 
among various types of actors operating at multiple levels in their efforts 
to achieve desired ends. Because of the complexity involved, what we will 
refer to as the Internet’s “political architecture” is a mapping of power and 
authority that includes the relationships among various institutions and other 
influential actors and policymakers who are best positioned to directly affect 
change in their environment. This is why our discussion encompasses the full 
governance spectrum, and not merely the public policies that are made and 
enforced by formal governmental institutions. Governments and the public 
sector are limited in their policymaking capabilities as a result of, first, the 
global dimension and “borderlessness” of the Internet, second, the decentral-
ized architecture of the environment, and third, the limits of technological 
capabilities. These, along with a unique developmental history characterized 
at least as much by grassroots movements as by governmental agencies, are 
the reasons Internet policymaking is differentiated from, by comparison, 
other traditional policy venues occurring in real-space. 
Defining governance in this way helps to place the title question at the 
heart of this study in context. For years, legislators of governments around 
the world have often grown frustrated when trying to transpose their authority 
in their attempts to regulate Internet content and behavior. Problems inevi-
tably arise involving territorial jurisdiction and frequent anonymity achieved 
through technical measures, and, as a result, many such governmental 
policymaking processes and implementation strategies have been rendered 
largely ineffectual. Attempts by U.S. national, state, or local governments to 
generate policies using a strictly vertical governmental approach have largely 
been ineffective at achieving desired ends—thus relegating such policies to 
the status of being merely symbolic actions. Rather, policies of governance, 
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emphasizing coordination among various public, private, and hybrid institu-
tions at every stage throughout the policy process, have become the primary 
mechanisms for constraining and enabling different aspects of Internet behav-
ior. To be clear, governments are still extremely relevant and essential in the 
policy process. However, the role of formal governmental institutions has 
often been fundamentally transformed in the Internet sphere to that of lead-
ing coordination-based strategies, acting as a policy catalyst for private-sector 
actions, or formalizing and legitimating previously made policy decisions 
after other actors had already propelled the policymaking process forward. 
WHAT do We MeAn by “THe InTerneT”?
The Internet is a rather generic term that often means very different things to 
different people. So in asking the question, “Who governs the Internet?” we 
need to clarify exactly what it is we are referring to. 
In terms of a functional definition, the Internet is a global decentralized 
network of computer networks, each of which is independently managed 
in whichever ways its administrator deems fit. Decisions, particularly over 
technical protocols, are often made by “rough consensus,” and their imple-
mentation relies completely on voluntary measures being adopted in order 
to facilitate reliable interconnection and communication. Moreover, the term 
refers to both the hardware and software components that connect the various 
networks and computing devices to each other. 
In conceptual terms for our discussion of governance, the various entities 
and ideas that together form the basis of the Internet must be deconstructed 
into their constituent parts in order to analyze what specifically is occurring 
with regard to governing the Internet as a whole. 
The model we propose in addressing this problem for explaining governance 
of the Internet is based on the conceptual scheme first put forth by economist 
and legal scholar Yochai Benkler.24
 This framework conceptualizes com-
munications systems into three layers: the physical architecture, the logical 
infrastructure (or the code), and the content layers. Benkler originally devised 
this scheme to understand structural media regulation, arguing that emerging 
modern network technologies make a decentralized and democratized infor-
mation environment possible—“enabling small groups of constituents and 
individuals to become ‘users’ (or participants), rather than simply ‘passive 
consumers’.” Benkler’s three layers were conceived as a means of present-
ing “a new set of regulatory choices” that governments have in decentralized 
networked environments, and though pertaining primarily to media regulation, 
I argue that they are valuable for conceptualizing entire modern information 
communications systems, including the full reach of the Internet itself. 
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Benkler’s framework was later applied by Lawrence Lessig, who used 
the three-layer model to argue that the Internet “mixes freedom and control 
at different layers.” In his attempt to assess notions of property rights and 
“the commons” in cyberspace, Lessig extended Benkler’s model in two 
fundamental ways. He utilized the three layers as a way of conceptualizing 
the Internet specifically, and he used them as a lens for analyzing systems of 
control—what is free, what is shared, and what is owned in cyberspace.25 This 
is particularly important for our purposes in determining governance. 
My proposal is to build upon this framework, yet also modify Benkler and 
Lessig’s code layer to create a new distinction within the code layer. This 
study will demonstrate that, when identifying the various actors and institu-
tions involved in Internet governance, two fundamentally different types of 
actors emerge within the code layer, and therefore it is important to draw 
this distinction in order to formulate a better understanding of governance 
arrangements. This will be done by emphasizing the difference between code, 
understood as technical protocols, versus code as the software developer’s 
tool for creating applications which the end-user encounters. The result is the 
emergence of what may ultimately be deemed a fourth layer, separating the 
code layer of Benkler into a protocols layer and an applications layer. This 
will highlight not only the differences between institutional actors who either 
create technical protocols or create private, proprietary web applications, but 
also the different types of actors involved in decision-making.
Thus, in contrast to Benkler’s three-layer model of (1) the physical archi-
tecture, (2) the logical infrastructure (the code), and (3) the content, I propose 
a new model be introduced that aims to conceptualize the Internet into four 
layers: 
1. The Infrastructure
2. The Technical Protocols
3. The Software Applications
4. The Content
The purpose of this four-layer model is to create a lens for policymakers 
who seek to produce intentional effects, and this is accomplished by break-
ing down the different political dynamics at each layer so that policymakers’ 
goals can be better aligned with implementation strategies. These various 
political dynamics will then be analyzed by addressing three questions within 
each layer: (1) Why is it important? (2) Who governs it? (3) How are policies 
being made within it?
By building upon this framework, the task of determining who governs 
the Internet becomes far more manageable. Public policies and governing 
efforts at each individual layer, examined independently and separate from 
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one another, can be more clearly ascertained as coherent strategies and tan-
gible entities. Actors at each layer are readily identifiable, and their roles in 
the policymaking process provide a greater capacity for reasonable analysis. 
In other words, my approach to answering, “Who governs the Internet?” will 
be broken down into “Who governs at each layer?” and “Who is governing 
across layers?”
lITerATure revIeW
The field of Internet governance is relatively new by academic standards 
having only just emerged in the past two decades, and has been developed by 
a strikingly multidisciplinary cross-section of scholars originating from the 
fields of law, economics, public administration, international relations, and 
more. Books on the subject loosely use the terms “govern,” “rule,” “regulate,” 
and “control” almost interchangeably, which belies the point that governing 
is based on a more complex political architecture of authority. Understanding 
both the technical and political dimensions across disciplines is vital. Too 
often policymakers draft regulatory laws applying to Internet technologies 
with little understanding of the technologies themselves. Likewise, far too 
few programmers of such pervading technologies have any involvement in, 
or knowledge of, the legal systems or the political systems which they are 
so deeply affecting. The intention here, therefore, is to help bridge this gap 
by building upon the existing literature across disciplines to develop a new 
framework central to understanding the governance on the Internet.
There are two general approaches that scholars have used to study Internet 
governance and public policy: (1) How the Internet is reshaping government 
and politics, and (2) How government and politics are reshaping the Internet. 
Our focus shall be on the latter.
The academic literature exposes several distinct arguments in answering 
how the Internet is being governed. There is an evolution of ideas in answer-
ing the question of who governs the Internet—and the wide range of answers 
include code, national and local governments, international regimes, self-
regulation, private engineering consortium groups, and more. Each of these 
not only serve as a potential counterargument to what will be presented in the 
chapters that follow, but they also help frame the scholarly evolution of the 
debate, placing the discussion to follow in better context.
In his path-breaking scholarship isolating architecture as a constraint on 
behavior online, Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig famously argued 
that code governs cyberspace, meaning that software is programmed to set 
the rules for behavior, and therefore code and its designers are the cen-
tral authority.26
 This “code governs” argument is extremely insightful in 
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emphasizing how, in digital environments, technical decision-making has 
inherently political consequences. Because code itself is an agent of authori-
tative power—constraining and enabling behavior by defining what actions 
are even possible in a given space—programmers have a disproportionate 
amount of authority at several of the single controlling points already men-
tioned. For example, whether it is controlling the operations of web servers, 
setting the TOS on social media websites, or establishing network bandwidth 
caps, programmers make binding decisions over the private virtual spaces 
that all users of their service must adhere to. They may not completely have 
free rein—again, the dynamic is too complex than to say any one group of 
actors controls everything and can do whatever they choose—but in their 
ability to write code to shape the environment, these programmers definitely 
prove themselves to be a large part of the governing equation.
However, the great limitation of this argument is that Lessig—to his 
credit—only claims that code governs cyberspace; not the Internet as a whole. 
This is a crucial distinction often misunderstood. Though commonly used as 
a synonym for the Internet, the term “cyberspace” actually refers to only one 
aspect within the Internet—the virtual environment where people interact 
with one another and where content, such as websites, images, ideas, and 
experiences, proliferate. As scholar David Bell has explained it, cyberspace 
is a cultural artifact—a “product of and producer of culture simultaneously.” 
It is the part of the Internet that “is lived.”27
 By contrast, the Internet itself is 
a communications network defined by its physical infrastructure comprised 
of wires and cables connecting devices. Its hardware can be found at specific 
geographical locations; it can be touched. To briefly put this in context, it can 
be said that someone may post a digital video to a website in cyberspace so 
long as their computer remains connected to the Internet. Lessig is correct in 
asserting that code governs cyberspace because, in this context, that is where 
code is deployed. However, code and its programmers play a far smaller role 
in the governing dynamic when examining different aspects of the Internet—
namely, for instance, the regulation of the physical infrastructure. This is the 
great limitation of the “code governs” argument—it is immensely valuable 
for understanding how policies get made regulating cyberspace, but not com-
prehensive enough to apply it to the Internet as a whole.
A contrasting argument was put forth by legal scholars Jack Goldsmith 
and Tim Wu who countered with the proposition that local and national 
governments increasingly govern cyberspace, as such governments have 
begun taking more proactive roles in formulating vertically designed public 
policies affecting cyberspatial content.28 Again the focus is on cyberspace, 
however their narrative suggests that national and local governments derive 
their power from an already-existing and clear ability to regulate the physi-
cal aspects of the Internet—notably, through a re-assertion of their territorial 
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jurisdiction. By leveraging their authority over the physical world—and, 
hence, the physical infrastructure of the Internet within their sovereign bor-
ders—but applying it to regulating content in cyberspace, Goldsmith and Wu 
are significantly taking a “cross-layer” approach, albeit in a limited fashion, 
by seeking to explain how authority over one aspect of the Internet can trans-
late into powerful consequences in another. This is an important point that 
will be revisited shortly.
Meanwhile, international relations scholar Marcus Franda argues that the 
Internet is governed by an international regime consisting of both the public 
and private sectors, and formalized through international agreements between 
governments.29 This is certainly a more comprehensive view of the Internet 
in its totality, and it utilizes a similar definition of governance based on coor-
dination among multiple actors at multiple levels. However, Franda explores 
Internet governance from a strict international relations perspective, and as 
a result his conclusions focus almost exclusively on formal institutions and 
organizations at that level. Ultimately, his approach is a comprehensive model 
that can be applicable to the Internet as a whole, but by under-emphasizing 
the role of individuals and grassroots efforts that have historically played a 
vital role in driving the Internet’s evolution forward, his argument doesn’t 
portray the full picture of power arrangements and policymaking efforts that 
are occurring in venues other than at the international level.
Then there is the aforementioned Milton Mueller and the cadre of scholars 
who define “Internet Governance” in the more narrow terms of its technical 
functionality, arguing that ICANN, the IETF, and a small handful of semi-
public international consortium groups comprised mostly of academics and 
engineers govern the Internet, focusing on the administration of the DNS 
system and standards-setting processes. This narrow definition certainly lends 
itself to solving the problem of who creates policies regarding the functional, 
day-to-day operation of the Internet—and international consortium groups 
like ICANN clearly demonstrate a decision-making authority in that realm. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, defining Internet governance in this way is 
generally unhelpful for understanding any Internet issue area other than those 
focused on technical functionality. 
Countering these different notions of code or some type of public or private 
institutions governing the Internet are proponents who argue that the Web is 
increasingly self-regulated by the masses of users, or netizens, who actively 
engage in cyberspatial activities and social networks. There are several prob-
lems with this argument. First, again, the argument is only intended to apply to 
cyberspace; not the Internet as a whole. Second, and more importantly, even 
just as the argument applies to cyberspace, there is a seemingly endless list 
of examples that contradict the notion that self-regulation is what is currently 
taking place. The anarchic vision of cyberspatial behavior having a complete 
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lack of oversight is more a part of Internet mythology than it is reality. When 
people visit websites, they are subject to several single controlling points such 
as the rules of the website, the web server, the ISP, the telecommunications 
carrier, and the government or governments who can claim territorial juris-
diction. As will be demonstrated repeatedly throughout this project, self-reg-
ulation is a normative, not empirical, depiction of Internet governance today.
Furthermore, much of the debate identifying who governs the Internet has 
centered on such normative issues of alternative cyber ideologies regard-
ing systems of control. The libertarian model for Internet governance was 
famously crystallized in John Perry Barlow’s classic Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace in 1996, calling for governments of the world 
to completely stay out of cyber affairs, and that “self-governance” by users 
will inevitably arise.30 However, scholars like Barbrook and Cameron have 
offered direct challenges to the cyber libertarian model, dissecting the prin-
ciple components of the “Californian school” by seeking to expose it as little 
more than “an incursion of capitalist values.”31 
There is a longer literary history concerned with the political nature of 
technologies. As it relates specifically to an Internet context, this is embodied 
by the debate over how technological systems institute control and order in 
people’s online activities.32 The architecture of the Internet enables and con-
strains certain forms of political behavior, and therefore that technical archi-
tecture and the policies which sustain it must be viewed as inherently political 
as well.33 This is a major point that ought not to be undervalued. In the context 
of Internet policymaking, technical decisions often have very political con-
sequences, and thus are often political actions in and of themselves. As will 
be explored throughout this study, decisions over which technical protocols 
to adopt or what type of software code to create have a direct effect on set-
ting the rules for what types of behaviors are even feasible in different cyber 
spaces, and such decision-making, therefore, inevitably embodies certain 
political values at the expense of others.
It is in this vein of the technical becoming political that Lessig’s “code is 
law” argument gains so much credence. He purports that just as laws regulate 
behavior in real-space, code regulates behavior in cyberspace, as “the soft-
ware and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as 
it is.” Technology is powerful but not uncontrollable, Lessig notes; it can 
be designed by human intervention to embody certain values. In the final 
analysis, cyberspace is made of code, created by people. How people write 
that code—the type of architecture they set up to protect certain values—will 
determine if cyberspace will become “free” in the libertarian sense, or “regu-
lable.” Indeed, he claims, the invisible hand of cyberspace, guided by com-
merce, has already constructed an architecture based on control and highly 
efficient regulation.34
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As to some examples of when code is law, Lessig cites (1) how in some 
places you must enter a password before you gain access, while in others you 
can gain access whether identified or not; (2) how in some places the transac-
tions you engage in produce traces that link those transactions back to you, 
while in others this link is achieved only if you want it to be; or (3) how in 
some places you can encrypt your communications, while in others encryp-
tion is not an option.
However, Tim Wu formulated a direct counterargument to Lessig’s “code 
is law” argument, publishing an article in the Virginia Law Review actually 
titled, “When Code Isn’t Law.”35 He asks, if the goal is to understand the net 
effect of code’s regulatory forces, how can we not examine the reaction to 
those forces? In other words, code only has the effect of law if it is largely 
being complied with, and in cyberspace compliance is certainly not always a 
given. Rather, he argues, code is more a mechanism for avoidance of the law 
than it is for change, or even a form of law itself. As he states, “Nothing the 
code designer does rewrites laws. Instead, code design defines behavior to 
avoid legal sanctions.” The examples he cites to illustrate how code is actu-
ally used for avoidance of the law include (1) virtual child pornography, (2) 
overseas gambling, (3) junk e-mail, and, (4) P2P file-sharing. Thus, according 
to Wu, code isn’t law because, although it can influence the success or failure 
of a law’s effects, it is more accurately viewed as a tool that interest groups 
use to avoid legal sanctions or use for legal advantage.
Aside from the debate over to what extent code is, or isn’t, a type of law, 
there is also a challenge to the Mueller-led techno-centric approach that 
focuses on the DNS system and standards-setting processes. Scholars such 
as Richard Collins have emphasized how, despite the Internet being a global 
medium, most of the scholarship takes the United States’ experience as its 
focus. While conceding the value of much of this work, Collins writes that, 
“the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. has, misleadingly, constructed a world of for-
profit domain name registries, fretting about network neutrality and the like 
as a global experience. It is not.” He further goes on to highlight three myths 
of Internet governance that are commonly made in the academic literature: 
(1) that Internet governance works best when the market decides; (2) that 
self-regulation is both pervasive and effective (national policies are only mar-
ginally important); and (3) that the Internet regulatory environment is distinct 
from legacy media.36
 
The main problem with the body of Internet governance literature to 
date is that each of these approaches ultimately leads to a far too narrow 
understanding of the governance of the entire Internet. Internet governance, 
particularly viewed through a policy lens, is far too complex to suggest that 
there is just one answer to the question—akin to one single individual or 
conspiracy of organizations behind the magic curtain pulling all the levers. 
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The aforementioned literature either focuses on only one particular aspect of 
the Internet or oversimplifies a very complicated topic in order to arrive at a 
single coherent answer. In the former case, it leaves the reader unsatisfied; in 
the latter, unconvinced. 
THe PolITICAl ArCHITeCTure oF THe InTerneT
There exist different sets of primary actors and political arrangements at each 
Internet layer. As a result, the policies that govern at each layer often have 
fundamentally different motivations underlying them and seek to achieve 
different, and often conflicting, objectives. The consequence of this dynamic 
has been the emergence of policy processes which often address issues and 
formulate policy alternatives too narrowly, failing to incorporate all four 
Internet layers. In my conclusion, I will argue that a more comprehensive 
policy process involving all of the layers is needed for effective governance 
of the Internet, and that such a process ought to be open and transparent.
The Internet is, in fact, being governed. Staking out a historical-
institutionalist approach, it will be demonstrated that policies have been 
intentionally developed which have shaped and continue to reshape the 
Internet itself. Again, direct evidence that governance is indeed taking place 
can be found in the case of ICANN and the governance of the DNS system.
Not only is the Internet, in fact, being governed, but it is being governed 
by specific and identifiable networks of policy actors at each of the con-
ceptual layers. Governments and public institutions, private commercial 
firms, public-private hybrid institutions, international agencies, and vari-
ous NGOs—including specific interest groups and engineering consortium 
groups—are all actively involved in coordination-based governance policies. 
What this study will seek to accomplish in Part I is an identification of 
which types of policy actors have decision-making authority—an ability to 
govern, by our previously stated definition—at each conceptual layer. To be 
certain, there exist different politics, relevant actors, institutional arrange-
ments, and types of public policies at all four of the Internet’s layers. It is 
their identification that is the primary task at hand.
In Chapter 2, we will develop a brief narrative of the Internet’s history 
from a governance perspective. After reviewing its evolution from being 
a Defense Department project to being transferred under National Science 
Foundation (NSF) control to, finally, being largely privatized and commer-
cialized, we will see how all four of our conceptual layers came about chrono-
logically and evolved through very different processes. We will argue that 
this historical development, including the parallel roles of both the public and 
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private sectors, still has tremendous ramifications for understanding Internet 
governance in the four conceptual layers today.
In Chapter 3, we will examine governance of the Infrastructure layer of 
the Internet, consisting of the wires, cables, and airwaves that make up the 
physical network itself. We will determine that the Internet’s wired network 
is governed by a small handful of private telecommunications firms and 
cable companies who own and operate the infrastructure, and the national 
governments around the world that, to varying extents, regulate them, and we 
will explain the political dynamic using an advocacy coalitions framework. 
Meanwhile, when it comes to governing the Internet’s wireless spectrum, we 
will assert that the Communications Act of 1934 and the spectrum-allocation 
auctions of recent years serve to demonstrate how and why the federal gov-
ernment—primarily the F.C.C—is the central governing authority, along 
with an epistemic community of engineers that is paramount in guiding its 
decision-making.
In Chapter 4, we will examine governance of the Protocol layer, referring 
to the technical standards and protocols that facilitate digital communication 
over the network. We will argue that decision-making authority is held by 
a small handful of international engineering consortium groups—primarily, 
the Internet Society (ISOC), its IETF, and the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C)—and we will then analyze the constitutional makeup of these orga-
nizations and assert that policymaking is best characterized by the “rough 
consensus” principle. Finally, we will assert that the decisions over which 
technical protocols to adopt, and how they are to be designed, are, in them-
selves, an important form of policy which constrain and enable behavior on 
the Internet.
In Chapter 5, we will examine governance of the Applications layer, refer-
ring to the software applications that enable people to use the Internet. We 
will illustrate how the code underlying both desktop and web applications is 
a form of policy itself. These software applications enable and constrain the 
actions of every Internet user on a technical basis, and thus we will demon-
strate how code constitutes a unique type of policy, one in which the environ-
ment itself is designed to deny the user even a capability to act in defiance. 
We will then argue that a relatively small handful of the most well-capitalized 
private commercial software firms govern the Internet’s applications the 
most—and this will be demonstrated based on several usability metrics. Ulti-
mately, we will assert that Lawrence Lessig’s “code is law” argument best 
explains how code constrains and enables Internet behavior, only, we will 
argue, that the code written by private commercial firms often indicates an 
implicit recognition of the sovereign authority that traditional governmental 
institutions retain over them.
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Finally, in Chapter 6, we will examine governance of the Internet’s Content 
layer, the most highly visible and controversial layer of them all. By high-
lighting several prominent issue areas such as the regulation of pornographic 
material online, efforts to mitigate spam, and the regulation of file-sharing 
over peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, we will argue that while national govern-
ments certainly have governing authority over Internet content to an extent, 
ISPs and private website operators (through their TOS Agreements) also have 
demonstrated their authority to make policies that directly constrain or enable 
behavior with intentional effects, particularly in the transnational context.
Fundamentally, these layers are not sequential, nor are they necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Policies made at one layer typically have significant 
consequences for shaping the policy environment at the other layers. For 
example, at the Protocol layer, the decision to adopt the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol, which is open and universally 
accessible, rather than alternatives that may have allowed for far more cen-
tralized control, directly led to the development of the open and decentral-
ized Internet that currently exists. If decisions had been made to adopt more 
closed, rather than open, standards and protocols, the policy environment 
affecting cyberspace at, say, the Content layer would be fundamentally differ-
ent, allowing for greater government-imposed systems of control—as central-
ized authority would be built into the technology itself.
As a result, from a prescriptive point of view, I will argue that policy objec-
tives can be best achieved by either identifying which layer is most appropri-
ate to a specific problem and designing narrowly targeted policies with the 
context of that specific layer’s political dynamics in mind, or by targeting 
one layer with the direct intent of causing cascading effects at another layer 
entirely. In other words, whether policymakers choose to work within the 
political architecture of one specific layer, or whether they choose to take a 
cross-layer approach seeking cascading effects, either way it is the conceiv-
ing of Internet-based problems in terms of our conceptual layers that will 
ultimately prove to be a valuable tool for policymakers. Doing so will enable 
the development of better Internet policies that can more reliably achieve 
desired outcomes. 
Policymakers ought to utilize this conceptual model because it accounts for 
the Internet’s complexities, both in technical and political terms. The four-
layer model, and its resulting map of political architecture creates four dis-
tinctive policy arenas, each with its own set of criteria for determining what 
policy designs are most appropriate, and each with its own political dynam-
ics that will ultimately influence to what extent a policy will be effective in 
achieving the desired outcomes. The question is as old as Political Science 
itself: If something needs to get done, who has the power to do it? The four-
layer model and its resulting map of political architecture provide the answer.
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THe CAse oF u.s. nATIonAl CyberseCurITy PolICy
In Part I of this study we will explore each of the four conceptual Internet 
layers—the Infrastructure, the Technical Protocols, the Software Applica-
tions, and the Content. At each, it will be ascertained why that layer is impor-
tant, who governs it, and how are policies being made that affect it. Viewed 
in its totality, this will define the current political architecture of the Internet.
In Part II we will apply this new four-layer model and resulting political 
architecture by performing a detailed case study on U.S. national cybersecu-
rity policy, post-9/11. As will be demonstrated, this case is a prime example 
both of what works and what doesn’t when policies are designed to coordi-
nate actions among governments, private commercial firms, hybrid institu-
tions, and the software and engineering communities—in other words, within 
the context of the political architecture that will be laid out. 
The story of U.S. cybersecurity policy can be thought of in two parts. First, 
in the initial years following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 
story is about the policymaking process that ultimately led to the National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC) policy document. Second, in the years 
since, the story is about the formation of a new bureaucratic regime headed 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Our objective will be to utilize our four-layer model and its resulting map 
of political architecture by analyzing the issue of national cybersecurity 
from a broad public policy perspective in order to test the hypothesis, and 
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commonly held perception, that cybersecurity policy’s failures are the result 
of a flawed policy design that focuses almost exclusively on voluntary public-
private partnerships.
First, we will conduct a descriptive analysis of the problem definition 
underlying the issue. The generalized problem which U.S. national cyberse-
curity policy is designed to address—namely, digital threats to the nation’s 
critical cyber assets—can be made more specific by deconstructing the 
problem using a layer-based approach. At the Infrastructure layer, the threats 
include outright destruction of the Internet’s physical components, such as 
critical telecommunications lines or operating centers, and the hijacking of 
industrial control systems, such as regional power grids. At the Applica-
tions layer, the threat is comprised of malicious code infiltrating vulnerable 
software applications to steal data or hijack network devices. At the Content 
layer, the threat comes in the form of defacement of websites or websites 
being taken offline completely.
The problem definition will be further analyzed by highlighting the cat-
egorical and specific mechanisms by which threat agents pursue their goals 
at each of the aforementioned layers. We will introduce a new typology that 
draws important distinctions between cyberterrorism, hacktivism, cracktiv-
ism, and cyberwarfare, and place specific deployment mechanisms like 
viruses, worms, botnets, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in 
this context. Again, our objective is to clarify the problem that cybersecurity 
policy is designed to address, and conceptualizing this complex, often vague, 
problem in terms of layers will prove useful in understanding the subsequent 
policy analysis.
Second, we will perform a detailed analysis of the primary document cur-
rently guiding U.S. national cybersecurity policy—the Bush administration’s 
NSSC.37
 The policy design of this document is important in how it implicitly 
addresses all four layers in our conceptual framework. It calls for enhanc-
ing the protection of the nation’s critical cyber assets by bolstering the 
defenses of the physical infrastructure, and directly references how this can 
be achieved through designing more secure technical standards and protocols, 
promoting more secure software application development in the private com-
mercial sector, and by patrolling Web content.
Third, we will examine the policymaking process that led to the National 
Strategy. This process can be characterized as open, but flawed. A presiden-
tial advisory board released 53 questions to the public for comment, then 
drafted an initial proposal which was discussed in several town hall meet-
ings across the country, ultimately leading to the final version of the policy. 
It was heavily influenced at every stage by large private corporations, and 
from the outset of its implementation it came under heavy criticism for fail-
ing to allocate enough resources to the problem and for relying on a strictly 
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voluntary public-private approach. Implementation was further hindered by 
a high turnover rate at the top levels within the newly created Executive 
bureaucracy—the DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD). As we 
will demonstrate, this policymaking process was inclusive of most of the 
major governing actors set forth in our political architecture (and that in itself 
is significant), however organizational conflicts between them, again contex-
tualized in terms of who has authority at each specific layer, played a large 
role in derailing the policy’s implementation.
Next, we will seek to clarify the current bureaucratic regime governing 
U.S. national cybersecurity policy. As will be explained, this regime had 
been headed primarily by the NCSD division within the DHS, however, 
following a weakened period of having conflicting roles with the newly cre-
ated National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), the NCSD is now competing 
intensely to retain its governing authority with the Department of Defense 
(DoD) and the National Security Agency (NSA), particularly the military’s 
CYBERCOM command center.
Finally, we will then attempt to tie all of this together by examining cyber-
security policy in action—namely, what actually happens in the face of a 
cyberattack. What becomes evident is the centrality of the private sector, par-
ticularly in preventing attacks; also, the reliance on software applications and 
technical protocols both in prevention and response, particularly network-
monitoring tools and specific antivirus products; and finally, that the federal 
government’s role is relegated primarily to being a coordinator among private 
actors. U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is vital to 
raising awareness about cyberattacks and for information-sharing, but ulti-
mately, U.S. national cybersecurity policy thus far limits the federal govern-
ment from taking more forceful measures beyond that point. The four-layer 
conceptual model again proves helpful in contextualizing both the problem 
stream and solution stream surrounding the issue by framing it in these terms.
Ultimately, by applying our four-layer model and its resulting map of polit-
ical architecture to the issue of U.S. national cybersecurity policy, we will 
argue that its overriding policy design and policymaking process are reflec-
tive of how all four conceptual layers are important in their own right, and that 
this confirms the utility of the four-layer model in general. The acknowledged 
failures of U.S. cybersecurity policy have more to do with an implementation 
process characterized by institutional turmoil within the Executive Branch of 
the federal government than with a flawed policy design or policymaking pro-
cess—and, in fact, this only serves to reinforce our argument that government 
alone does not have adequate governing authority to achieve their desired 
outcomes. Even the common criticism of the NSSC’s policy design relying 
too heavily on public-private partnerships is not so much a flawed design 
element as it is a recognition of the Internet’s decentralized reality where 
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numerous governing actors have authority at different layers. The lessons 
of U.S. cybersecurity policy reaffirm that the best way to create meaningful 
Internet policies that can be effectively implemented lies in creating policies 
that target the layer most appropriate to specific problems in order to produce 
intentional cascading effects at, what is often, another layer entirely.
In summary, the main purpose of this book will be three-fold: (1) to develop 
a new conceptual model that deconstructs the Internet into four policy layers; 
(2) to use this model in formulating a new political architecture that accu-
rately maps out and depicts authority on the Internet—ultimately determining 
who governs at each layer; and (3) to use the case of U.S. national cyberse-
curity policy, post-9/11, in order to evaluate the usefulness of both. If we are 
to answer, “Who governs the Internet?,” we need to know how to frame the 
question, how to answer it, and whether or not our method of framing and our 
answers are helpful. That is our goal in the following chapters.
noTes
1. Joint Project Agreement Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (September 29, 2006). 
Retrieved on February 28, 2013 from http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
signedmou290906.pdf.
2. “Program Statistics,” ICANN. Retrieved on June 7, 2015 from http://newgtlds.
icann.org/en/program-status/statistics.
3. Ingrid Lunden, “ICANN Applicants for New TLDs Revealed as Part of 
‘Reveal Day’: The Full List,” TechCrunch (June 13, 2012). Retrieved on February 28, 
2013 from http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/13/icann-applicants-for-new-tlds-revealed- 
the-full-list/.
4. Milton L. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of 
Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
5. Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
6. B. Guy Peters and John Pierre, “Governance Without Government? Rethinking 
Public Administration,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8.2. 
(April 1998): 223–243.
7. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961). See page 3: “if there are great inequal-
ities in the conditions of different citizens, then there must also be great inequali-
ties in the capacities of different citizens to influence the decisions of their various 
governments.”
8. Carolyn J. Hill and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., “Is Hierarchical Governance in 
Decline? Evidence from Empirical Research,” Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 15.2 (2005): 173–195.
Domanski_9781498512701.indb   22 10-09-2015   11:21:45
 Framing the Question, “Who Governs the Internet?” 23
9. H. George Frederickson and Kevin B. Smith, The Public Administration 
Theory Primer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003).
10. Hill and Lynn, 175.
11. Hill and Lynn, 174.
12. Candice Jones, William S. Hesterly, and Stephen P. Borgatti, “A General 
Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” 
The Academy of Management Review 22.4 (October 1997): 911–945.
13. Mark C. Taylor, The Moment of Complexity (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001).
14. Richard Collins, Three Myths of Internet Governance: Making Sense of 
Networks, Governance, and Regulation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 59.
15. Collins, 60.
16. Piotr Konieczny, “Adhocratic Governance in the Internet Age: The Case of Wiki-
pedia,” Journal of Information Technology and Politics 7.4 (October 2010): 263–283.
17. Henry Mintzberg, Tracking Strategies: Toward a General Theory (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 2007).
18. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1999). Lessig does not explicitly define “governance,” but makes references 
to how code and “architecture regulates behavior” in cyberspace, and to “constraints 
on how you behave.” See Chapter 7.
19. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1980).
20. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1956). See pp. 3–4: “Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less impor-
tant than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their 
failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the 
decisions they do make. . . . Often they are uncertain about their roles, and even more 
often they allow their fears and their hopes to affect their assessment of their own 
power. No matter how great their actual power, they tend to be less acutely aware of 
it than the resistances of others to its use.”
21. Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London, England: Allen and 
Unwin, 1938).
22. Laura DeNardis offers a helpful definition of Internet governance referring to 
“policy and technical coordination issues related to the exchange of information over 
the Internet” in the context of architecting civil liberties into IPv6 protocol design. 
See Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009).
23. Marcus Franda, Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International 
Regime (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).
24. Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation,” Federal Communications Law Journal 52 (2000): 561–563.
25. Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a 
Connected World (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2002).
26. Lessig, Code.
Domanski_9781498512701.indb   23 10-09-2015   11:21:45
24 Chapter 1
27. David Bell, An Introduction to Cybercultures (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2001), 2.
28. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Border-
less World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006).
29. Franda.
30. John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996). 
Retrieved on January 5, 2006 from http://www.eff.org/~barlow/library.html.
31. Richard Barbrook and A. Cameron, The Californian Ideology (1996). Retrieved 
on August 23, 2012 from http://www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk/theory-californianideology.
html.
32. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics Out of Control as a 
Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977).
33. Andrew Shapiro, The Control Revolution: How the Internet is Putting Indi-
viduals in Charge and Changing the World We Know (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 
1999).
34. Lessig, Code.
35. Tim Wu, “When Code Isn’t Law,” Virginia Law Review 89.4 (June 2003): 
679–751.
36. Collins.
37. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003). Retrieved on 
March 5, 2005 from http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/
docs/cyberspace_strategy%5B1%5D.pdf.
Domanski_9781498512701.indb   24 10-09-2015   11:21:45
